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Chapter 1.
Public Governance as a
Key Determinant of FDI :
A Comparative Analysis 
of Sub-Saharan Africa and 
South-East Asia Host Countries
Rodolphe Desbordes, Céline Azémar 
and Jean-Louis Mucchielli *
TEAM, Université Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne
1. Introduction
The World Bank (2000), in its report on « Quality of Growth »,
emphasises the importance of public governance as the keystone of
a country’s development. Studies examining determinants of foreign
direct investment (FDI) are also increasingly taking account of
such fundamentals as institutional and political factors. Thus, rule
of law, bureaucratic corruption, educational attainment or quality
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of physical infrastructure are now included in econometric analyses
next to more common variables such as market size, labour costs or
trade openness. In other words, good governance appears to be a
key condition for attracting FDI. For instance, Lehmann (1999),
shows that a country like India could increase its share of US affi-
liates’ physical investment by 50% if it were to eliminate all politi-
cal uncertainty.
For a developing country, the stakes for improving its public
governance are high. Beyond an increase in its growth rate, a favou-
rable business climate is likely to attract more FDI and enhance their
alleged spillovers. More FDI means more financial resources for the
host country, whereas it is likely that the technological intensity of
these investments and the transfer of foreign know-how to domestic
firms will largely depend on the quality of public governance.
This article has three goals. First, to clarify why public governan-
ce is likely to influence FDI inflows. Second, to propose a new eva-
luation of public governance through the construction of quantitative,
relatively objective, easily replicable and sample-specific indicators.
The public governance of two geographic zones will be assessed
through this method: Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South-East Asia
(SEA). As shown in table 1.1, the former attracts much less FDI than
the latter. Third, to test econometrically whether public governance
explains the diverging abilities of SSA and SEA to attract FDI. 
The paper is constructed as follows : section 2 examines the
theory behind the potential influence of public governance on
foreign direct investment and compares the governance conditions
in SEA and SSA, through the use of self-made public governance
indicators. Section 3 tests econometrically which governance 
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Table 1.1 
Distribution of FDI flows throughout the world, 1980-2001
         
Source: UNCTAD World Investment Report 2002 and UNCTAD FDI/TNC database: http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/
indicators have an influence on foreign direct investment flows and
how well public governance explains the diverging attractiveness of
SEA and SSA. Section 4 concludes.
2. Theory of Public Governance : Impact on Foreign Direct
Investment
2.1 Public governance: definition, impact on foreign
direct investment and statistical evaluation
Kaufmann et al. (1999) define public governance as « the tradi-
tions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised »
(p.1). Five dimensions of government performance can be outlined :
a) Freedom and political stability
b) Provision of public goods 
c) Macroeoconomic policy
d) Property rights and contract enforcement 
e) Corporate governance.
Each can help create a satisfactory business climate for foreign
investors, as follows :
a) Freedom and political stability
Political freedom corresponds to the right of citizens to 
choose, monitor and replace the people in power. Freedom of
expression, assembly, association (including business activity), 
religion and oppression can be classified under the heading of civil
liberties. Nevertheless, freedom does not necessarily imply political
stability, which can be defined as frequent regular or irregular
changes in the government in power, through peaceful or violent
26
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means and by the existence of checks and balances constraining the
Executive.
Political instability in countries is likely to deter FDI inflows
because the legal environment is unpredictable. As the future is
uncertain, firms may prefer to wait for new information.  Moreover,
democratic countries stand a better chance of attracting FDI
because  this political system tends to favour a more stable and
transparent business climate in the long run (Rivera-Batiz, 2001 ;
Rodrik, 1999) and because multinational companies are increasin-
gly reluctant to invest in a repressive regime, so as to preserve their
brand name and image (Letnes, 2002).
b) Provision of public goods
As La Porta et al. (1999) point out, government plays a large
role in delivering health, education, infrastructure, particularly when
the use of these goods cannot be confined to certain individuals.
The efficiency of its interventionism depends largely on its bureau-
cracy, which can be seen as another public good (La Porta et al.,
1999 ; Rauch and Evans, 2000). Health and education enhance a
worker’s productivity and therefore lower the efficiency wage rate,
i.e. the absolute wage rate deflated by the productivity of labour
force. A positive link might therefore arise between the location of
multinational firms attempting to take advantage of international
differences in factor prices, and these public goods. Carr et al.
(2002) offer two other explanations. First of all, it is likely that the
setting-up of a foreign plant will require a certain amount of skilled
labour. Furthermore, human capital should be correlated with other
FDI determinants, such as physical and institutional infrastructure. 
27
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AS A KEY DETERMINANT OF FDI : 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA HOST COUNTRIES
Pro-business measures, including reductions in bureaucratic
« red tape » and corruption, are seen as increasing determinants of
foreign direct investment flows (Mallampally and Sauvant, 1999).
Conversely, burdensome and lengthy administrative procedures
required to establish and operate a business are likely to discoura-
ge FDI. Likewise, there may well be a strong correlation between
administrative costs and bureaucratic corruption, since public offi-
cials may impose these excessive regulations on multinational com-
panies to extract rents from them. Indeed, as explained by Wei and
Wu (2001), « the need for international investors to pay bribery and
deal with extortion by corrupt bureaucrats tends to increase with the
frequency and the extent of their interactions with local bureaucrats »
(p5). Foreign investors are therefore confronted with an additional
tax, whose rate is uncertain (Wei, 1997). 
c) Macroeoconomic policy
The goal of a macroeconomic policy is to maintain the internal
and external balance of the macroeconomic system (Krugman and
Obstfeld, 2001) . The internal equilibrium refers to the full use of
the factors of production and to price stability. The external equili-
brium implies that the trade balance is high enough to allow the
country to pay back its foreign debts.
FDI is unlikely to flow to economically unstable countries as they
do not offer a stable and predictable business environment and 
because the deterioration of internal and external macroeconomic
indicators, i.e. inflation and trade balance, may engender higher taxes
and capital controls as well as the increased use of import barriers,
probably reducing the expected profitability of a foreign investment.
28
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d) Security of property rights and contract enforcement
North (1990) defines property rights as « the rights individuals
appropriate over their own labour and the goods and services they
possess. Appropriation is a function of legal rules, organizational
forms, enforcement, and norms of behaviour — that is, the institu-
tional framework » (p.33). The creation, protection and enforce-
ment of property rights are particularly important because without
them the scope for market transactions is limited (World Bank,
2002). North (1990) and more recently Clague et al. (1999) have
emphasised the need for third-party enforcement when transac-
tions are not simultaneous. Because the market has clear limits
when it comes to enforcing contracts, this role is devolved upon the
government, notably through its judiciary system. However, this
authority also possesses the power to expropriate agents. 
Foreign investors demand protection of their property rights,
especially when their ownership advantage lies in their technologi-
cal level.  Otherwise, they are denied the return on their invest-
ment, which means that without this profit incentive, they will not
be inclined to take a risk and invest in the potential host country
(Drabek and Payne, 1999). Furthermore, whenever their property
rights are threatened and their contracts violated, multinational
companies must be able to quickly settle their disputes through the
legal system. 
e) Corporate governance
Corporate governance relates to the regulatory settings for a
firm’s decision-making. For the OECD (1999), good corporate
governance implies (1) the protection of shareholders’rights ; (2)
29
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equitable treatment of shareholders, including minority and 
foreign shareholders ; (3) recognition of the stakeholders’rights ;
(4) timely and accurate disclosure on all material matters regarding
the corporation ; (5) a responsible board that is fully informed and
accountable to the company and shareholders. Corporate gover-
nance can be associated with public governance as it is the govern-
ment’s duty to ensure that the proper rules have been enacted and
that they are adequately enforced by independent authorities. 
FDI is likely to be drawn towards countries offering a 
strong corporate governance framework for at least two reasons.
First, weak corporate governance may fuel economic instability
(Acemoglu and Johnson, 2002). Second, FDI is increasingly taking
the form of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) 4, and it
can therefore be expected that the quality of corporate governance
plays a role in the acquisition decisions of multinational companies.
2.2. A review of indicators of public governance and 
institutional quality
Most studies on the performance of public governance use 
subjective indexes which are based on polls of experts (Business
International, International Country Risk Guide, Business Envi-
30
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4. Indeed, according to UNCTAD (1999) “ available information suggests that cross-
border M&A activity has accounted for between one-half and two-thirds of world FDI
flows in the 1990. The figure is higher for developed than for developing countries,
but the difference is principally due to the smaller role of M&As in China. If China is
excluded, the share of M&A in cumulative FDI in 1992–1997 turns out to be 72 per
cent, up from 22 per cent during 1988–1991. […] Thus, the recent boom in FDI flows
to developing economies has, with the exception of China, consisted predominant-
ly of M&A, largely in the services sector ” (p 118). In these countries, this phenome-
non has been largely driven by privatisation programmes, such as in Latin America
(ibid.., p118). In 2002, privatisations still accounted for 60% of the value of M&As
(World Bank, 2003, p.86). 
ronmental Risk Intelligence, Freedom House) or cross-country 
survey of firms (World Development Report, 1997). Some disad-
vantages with using this type of indicators can be pointed out. Most
of them are obviously not freely available and logically select the
countries in which foreign investors are most interested. The 
accuracy of a country’s rating depends on the knowledge of the
expert(s) assessing it. Moreover, evaluators may be influenced by a
country's recent economic performance when they evaluate its 
institutional efficiency. Indeed, Chong and Calderon (2000) found
a two-way causality between institutional quality (BERI or ICRG
indexes) and growth rate. Finally, commercial country risk indexes
tend to assess  developed and developing countries and therefore
contrast the latter with the former; as mentioned by Morisset
(2001), African countries tend to be concentrated at the bottom of
commercial rankings. 
2.3 A comparative numerical analysis of public gover-
nance in South-East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa
2.3.1. Methodology and data used to measure governance aspects
In order to create indexes measuring the different dimensions
of public governance, principal component analysis will be used.
This is a statistical technique for data reduction as the objective is
to find the unit-length linear combinations of the variables with the
greatest variance. This method should help by creating weighted
indexes that are not biased by the researcher’s subjective choices.
Furthermore, given the presence of multicollinearity, it makes
sense to form a composite index. Finally, the ranking that will be
31
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generated in this way will have the advantage of being specific to
the sample used ; African and Asian countries will be compared to
each other, on the basis of available statistical information. 
Four dimensions of public governance will be evaluated with a
principal component analysis : 5




The variables, described below, were chosen on the basis of their
relevance and spatial/temporal availability (table 1.2). As is well-
known, statistics on developing countries, especially African nations,
are scarce.
Two periods are observed: 1976-1985 and 1986-1995 6. The cal-
culations have been made with the two time spans included, in order
to be able to track the evolution of public governance conditions.
Each index has been rescaled from zero to ten. A public global gover-
nance index has been computed such as :
Public Governance Index = (Freedom Index + Macroeconomic Poli-
cies Index + Public Goods Index) – Socio-political Instability Index
2.3.2. Numerical confirmation of a global better public governance cli-
mate in South-East Asia compared to Sub-Saharan Africa
The data and methodology used in this paper confirm that the
quality of the institutions in SEA is much higher than in SSA (table
1.3). SEA has fared better than SSA in terms of macroeconomic 
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5. Only the first principal component is used.
6.  As institutions tend to be very stable over time, it would therefore be meaningless
to observe the evolution of governance conditions over a short time period
Table 1.2
Description of the variables used to measure 
different governance dimensions
34
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Table 1.3 
Indicators of public governance dimensions 
for a pooled SEA and SSA sample

policies, provision of public goods, political, civil and economic free-
dom. However, this region has also undergone higher socio-political
instability, which has frequently been a prelude to democratic
reforms. Conversely, political stability in Sub-Saharan Africa should
be viewed by and large through the joint prisms of repression and
immobility (Goldsmith, 1998).  
While SEA countries are well-ranked, some SSA nations, such
as Botswana, Mauritius and to a lesser extent Gambia or Benin, 
follow them closely. Moreover, SEA region hosts some « lame
ducks », such as Indonesia or Philippines, which have not done
much better, in terms of public governance, than the average 
African country.
Although no generalisation should be made without caution, 
globally, the public governance conditions of these two regions are
opposite. This paper will now attempt to determine whether they have
an influence on foreign direct investment flows and how well public
governance explains the diverging attractiveness of SEA and SSA.
3. Econometric study on the impact of public governance on
foreign direct investment in Sub-Saharan Africa and South-
East Asia
It has been shown that, in theory, diverging governance condi-
tions should explain why SEA has attracted much more FDI than
SSA. For the sample used in this study, the difference in the weigh-
ted average share of FDI in GDP between SEA and SSA is 1.68%,
over the 1976-1995 period (table 1.4 7).
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7. Weighted averages, according to the share of the host country in regional output.
Numerous studies have demonstrated that each dimension of
public governance has a positive impact on FDI (table 1.5). In order
to test whether the public indicators constructed in this paper help
to explain the diverging abilities of SEA and SSA in terms of attrac-
ting FDI, a panel data model is used. The sample includes 33 coun-
tries in all - 26 SSA countries and 7 SEA countries (table 1.3). Two
periods are observed: 1976-1985 and 1986-1995. As is standard in
the literature, the dependent variable is the ratio of net FDI flows to
GDP (Asiedu, 2002). The explanatory variables are the governance
indicators, given in table 1.2 No other independent variables are
included as the governance measures should proxy for most of the
39
PUBLIC GOVERNANCE AS A KEY DETERMINANT OF FDI : 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA HOST COUNTRIES
Table 1.4
Differences in the quality of the public governance 
between SEA and SSA
 
determinants of FDI found significant in previous works (Wheeler
and Mody, 1992; Singh and Jun, 1995; Chunlai, 1997). Nor is the
output growth rate taken directly into account, since numerous 
studies have shown a clear link between economic growth and good
public governance (Aaron, 1999 ; Dethier, 1999). 
Concerning the estimated specification, the Breuch-Pagan
lagrangian multiplier test suggests that the random effect model is
more appropriate that a pooled model. Moreover, the Hausman test
indicates that the former should be preferred to the fixed effects
model. Accordingly, the equation to be estimated is : 
(FDI/GDP)it = a
i + b (Public Governance Indicator)it + e
i
t.
As illustrated by regression (1), the global public governance
index is a strong determinant of FDI (table 1.6). This positive link
appears to be driven by the macroeconomic policies index and the
public goods index [ (3,4,6,7)] ; other indicators are not significant
[(2,5,6)]. These results are in line with other studies such as 
Wheeler and Mody (1992), Singh and Jun (1995), Chunlai (1997),
Lehmann (1999), Asiedu (2001) or Carr et al. (2002) 7. Thus, inter-
national investors, when they make their location decisions, seem to
favour countries with (a) sustainable and outward-oriented market
policies, and (b) a high provision of public goods. These factors of
attractiveness have certainly mattered for different reasons in SSA
and SEA. In Africa, during this period, most FDI inflows were
resource-seeking and therefore raw materials had to be easily and
cheaply exported; a high-quality infrastructure and an open trade
40
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7. These results are robust to the inclusion of a dummy for exporters of natural
resources (50 % or more of total exports).
   
Table 1.5
A selected survey of the impact of public governance on FDI
policy diminish transport costs. In Asia, FDI were more concentra-
ted in the manufacturing sector. Owing to their openness, the low
cost of a relatively skilled labour force and their proximity with
Japan, these countries have indeed played an active part in the ver-
tical integration of multinational enterprises 9. 
On the other hand, the freedom index and the socio-political
instability index are not significant. In SSA, it is likely that the return
to investment was high enough to compensate for the lack of freedom
and the political risk (Asiedu, 2002). Moreover, as argued by Busse
(2003), « the firms in the extractive industries depended to a large
extent on good relations with the government of the host country. To
secure their investment and (later on) profits, the MNEs had to pro-
tect and keep access to the natural resource. In a similar fashion, host
country governments depended in some cases on the flow of foreign
exchange from the MNE investment in their country. Since both
sides thus had an interest in physically protecting the investment,
connections between MNEs and the host government could have
been expected to be close and the MNEs might have supported
repressive regimes ». In SEA, although authoritarian regimes were
common at the end of the seventies, political leaders used as legiti-
mising devices, « a commitment to sharing growth and the develop-
ment of  secure political foundation for granting economic rights to
economic agents in the private sector » (Park, 2001, p.10). Further-
more, it is likely that multinational companies have viewed the politi-
cal instability that has preceded the advent of democracy in certain
SEA countries as temporary and not threatening for their investment.
42
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9. In 1988, 52% of FDI stock in Africa was in the primary sector and 21% in the manu-
facturing sector. In Asia, the percentages were 14% and 43%, respectively (UNC-
TAD, 2001).
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Table 1.6
Public Governance as a determinant of FDI in SEA and SSA
Based on regression (7) and table 1.4, it is possible to calculate
the impact of diverging public governance conditions on the 
difference between FDI’s average shares of GDP in SEA and SSA,
over the 1976-1995 period (table 1.7). Thus, the quality of public
governance accounts for 90% of this difference !
Standard deviations are in parenthesis and ***, **, and * denote significance at 0.01,
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively.
4.Conclusion
By comparing Sub-Saharan African and South-East Asian host
countries, this paper has demonstrated that public governance is a
strong determinant of FDI inflows. First, various public governance
indicators have been constructed which show that overall, SEA
countries possess much better institutions that SSA countries.
Second, it has been econometrically shown that FDI flows to coun-
tries that carry out sustainable and outward-oriented macroecono-
mic policies and deliver a high provision of public goods, such as a
reliable physical infrastructure. The estimation results suggest that
diverging public governance conditions account for 90% of the dif-
ference between FDI’s average shares of GDP in SEA and SSA,
over the 1976-1995 period. 
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Table 1.7 
Public governance as an explanation of the difference 
in FDI share between SEA and SSA
The constructed indicators have been quite useful for several
reasons. First of all, they offer a new analytical way of gathering and
summarising usual and new determinants of foreign direct invest-
ment in the five dimensions of public governance. Next, they have
been based on relatively quantitative and objective data, making
them easily replicable. Finally, they are specific to the sample used,
thereby allowing detailed comparisons between SSA and SEA
countries. They are a huge improvement on country-risk commer-
cial indicators, which tend to be too subjective, unclear from a
methodological point of view, do not rate all countries and give
broad scores which are not always sufficiently dispersed to distin-
guish the business climate of two different countries. 
To sum up, this paper suggests that countries wishing to attract
these capital flows and benefit from their alleged positive effects in
terms of productivity and growth 10, must earmark a larger share of
their resources to strengthening their institutions.
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10. Surveys on the impact of FDI on the host country economy can be found for 
instance in Hanson (2000) or Lipsey (2002). On the basis of case studies, Moran
(1998) also suggests that the magnitude of the spillovers depends on the host
investment climate.  
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